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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
Nos. 17-1292 and 17-3217 
_____________ 
 
ALI FARES SAMARA, 
                                                        Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
         Respondent 
______________ 
 
On Petitions for Review of Orders of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA No. A078-492-776) 
Immigration Judge: Honorable Rosalind K. Malloy 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 15, 2018 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., BIBAS, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: January 29, 2019) 
______________ 
 
OPINION * 
______________ 
  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Petitioner Ali Fares Samara (“Samara”) challenges a final order of removal of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  In support of his challenge, Samara raises three 
arguments.  However, the first two arguments fail and the last is beyond this Court’s 
jurisdiction.  We will therefore deny in part and dismiss in part Samara’s petitions for 
review.    
I. BACKGROUND 
 Samara, a native of Jordan, came to the United States at the age of 34.  Although 
he entered the country legally, pursuant to a B-1 visitor visa, he unlawfully overstayed his 
visa and began working at a convenience store in Philadelphia.  Nearly three years later, 
Samara married Rose Marie Martelli (“Martelli”), a United States citizen.  Based on this 
marriage, Samara received conditional lawful permanent resident (“CLPR”) status.            
 Soon, Samara and Martelli jointly filed a Form I-751: Petition to Remove the 
Conditions on Residence (“I-751”).  Following an interview with Samara and Martelli, 
however, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) found that 
their marriage was fraudulent and denied their I-751.  Samara and Martelli filed a motion 
to reopen the termination of their I-751 but that motion was also denied.   
A few years later, Samara filed a second I-751 on his own.  This time, he 
requested a waiver of the joint petition requirement on the grounds that, although he had 
entered into his marriage with Martelli in good faith, it had terminated through divorce or 
annulment.  Following another interview, USCIS again concluded that Samara and 
Martelli’s marriage was a sham and memorialized its findings in an investigative report 
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drafted by Officer David Spaulding.  As a result, USCIS denied Samara’s second I-751, 
thus terminating his CLPR status.       
Based on these developments, the United States Department of Homeland Security 
commenced removal proceedings against Samara, beginning with a Form I-862: Notice 
to Appear (“NTA”).  The NTA charged Samara with removability under 
sections 237(a)(1)(A) and 237(a)(1)(D)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 
(“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) & (D)(i), based on marriage fraud and termination of 
his CLPR status, respectively.  Samara admitted to all allegations in the NTA, except the 
allegation that his marriage to Martelli was a sham.   
After reviewing the record and conducting a merits hearing, at which Samara 
testified, an immigration judge (“IJ”) issued a 19-page decision chronicling her findings 
and conclusions.  The decision highlighted a host of information detrimental to Samara, 
including that Samara and his Jordanian ex-wife, whom he had allegedly divorced before 
marrying Martelli, conceived a child and traveled internationally together after their 
alleged divorce; Samara did not date or live with Martelli as long as he had originally 
stated; Samara fathered a child with another woman while married to Martelli and 
withheld this information in his I-751 proceedings; Samara presented false documents 
and potentially used an imposter to pose as Martelli at the first USCIS interview; and 
Samara paid Martelli lump sums every month.   
Upon finding that Samara’s testimony was “rife with inconsistencies” and even 
“implausible,” the IJ determined that Samara’s testimony warranted an adverse 
credibility finding.  App. 24–25.  The IJ then concluded that, even in the absence of the 
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adverse credibility finding, Samara did not warrant a good faith marriage waiver because 
he had not demonstrated that he and Martelli commingled assets, assumed joint liabilities, 
or cohabitated after marriage; they did not have any children during their marriage; and 
ample evidence indicated that Samara had married Martelli for immigration benefits.  As 
a result, the IJ denied Samara’s good faith marriage waiver application, terminated 
Samara’s CLPR status, and ordered that Samara be removed to Jordan.   
 Initially, Samara appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA.  The BIA, however, fully 
affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed Samara’s appeal.  A few months later, Samara 
filed a motion to reopen and remand before the BIA, seeking to adjust his immigration 
status based on his new marriage to Nehayah Saleh (“Saleh”), a United States citizen.  
The BIA denied the motion, concluding that a new petition based on Samara’s marriage 
to Saleh was “likely precluded” under section 204(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c), 
given his prior sham marriage to Martelli.  App. 7 (citation omitted).  
 Before us, Samara now timely appeals both of the BIA’s decisions—(1) its 
dismissal of his appeal of the IJ’s denial of his application for a good faith marriage 
waiver (the “First Decision”) and (2) its denial of his motion to reopen and remand (the 
“Second Decision”)—in a consolidated action.  For the reasons set forth below, however, 
we will deny in part and dismiss in part his petitions for review.  
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The IJ had authority to consider Samara’s good faith marriage waiver under 8 
U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B).  The BIA had jurisdiction to consider Samara’s appeal of the 
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IJ’s decision under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3).  It further had jurisdiction to consider 
Samara’s motion to reopen and remand under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).   
Our jurisdiction arises under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  We typically review the 
BIA’s opinion as a final agency decision, but where, as here, the BIA “invokes specific 
aspects of the IJ’s analysis and fact-finding,” we review both decisions.  Green v. Att’y 
Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 506 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 613 (3d 
Cir. 2005)).  While we lack jurisdiction to review, like here, the agency’s discretionary 
decision to deny a good faith marriage waiver application, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), 
we retain jurisdiction to address constitutional and legal issues, id. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  We 
review such constitutional and legal issues de novo but give deference under Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to the 
agency’s interpretation of the INA.  Green, 694 F.3d at 506 (citing Sarango v. Att’y Gen., 
651 F.3d 380, 383 (3d Cir. 2011)).     
III. DISCUSSION 
 On appeal, Samara raises three arguments as to why this Court should reverse the 
BIA’s decisions:  the BIA erred by affirming (1) the IJ’s application of an overly 
burdensome legal standard; (2) the IJ’s consideration of the USCIS report; and (3) the 
IJ’s reliance on Martelli’s hearsay and credibility.  Because the first two arguments are 
unavailing and the last touches on matters beyond this Court’s jurisdiction, we will deny 
in part and dismiss in part Samara’s petitions.   
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A. Samara Has Waived Any Claim Regarding the Second Decision 
As a preliminary matter, Samara purports to appeal via this consolidated action 
both the First Decision and the Second Decision.  Indeed, his first petition for review 
refers to the First Decision and his second petition for review refers to the Second 
Decision.  But his opening brief fails to address any aspect of the Second Decision.  
Accordingly, he has waived any claim regarding the Second Decision and we therefore 
decline to address it.  See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations 
omitted).   
B. The IJ Applied the Correct Legal Standard 
 Notwithstanding the jurisdictional bar to our reviewing the BIA’s factual or 
discretionary determinations, we still retain jurisdiction over any constitutional claims or 
questions of law.  Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 633–34 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(citations omitted).  Samara’s first argument raises a question of law:  that the IJ applied 
an overly burdensome legal standard in evaluating his application for a good faith 
marriage waiver.  See Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 153–54 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(citations omitted) (noting that whether an agency applies the correct legal standard is a 
question of law).        
 In particular, Samara avers that the IJ improperly applied—and the BIA erred in 
affirming the IJ’s application of—an overly stringent “heavy burden of proof” standard.  
Pet.’s Br. 9. (quoting App. 24–25).  The alleged error stems from a sole sentence in the 
IJ’s 19-page decision, where she stated the legal standard applicable when a petitioner 
has previously withdrawn a prior visa petition based on an admission of fraudulent 
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marriage.  See App. 24 (citing Matter of Laureano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 1 (BIA 1983)).  Here, 
Laureano is inapposite for two reasons:  (1) Samara’s first petition was denied by USCIS, 
not withdrawn by him; and (2) Samara’s first petition yielded a determination by USCIS 
that the marriage was fraudulent, not such an admission from Samara or Martelli.  
Instead, Samara should have been held to a “preponderance of the evidence” standard.  
E.g., Boluk v. Holder, 642 F.3d 297, 302 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); Lara v. Lynch, 
789 F.3d 800, 804 (7th Cir. 2015); Oropeza-Wong v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1135, 1148 (9th 
Cir. 2005).      
 Samara first raised this argument in his appeal to the BIA.  But the BIA squarely 
addressed and rejected it.  Though it acknowledged that the IJ indeed stated “heavy 
burden” instead of mere “burden,” the BIA still affirmed the IJ’s decision, reasoning that 
she nonetheless applied the correct legal standard.  App. 4.  In doing so, the BIA 
explained that, as to the dispositive question of whether Samara and Martelli intended to 
establish a life together upon marriage, the IJ correctly denied Samara’s good faith 
marriage waiver application. 
 Now before us, Samara essentially seeks to relitigate the BIA’s disposition of this 
same argument.  But the BIA did not err in affirming the standard applied by the IJ.  As 
the BIA itself explained, although the IJ may have misstated the legal standard, she 
applied the correct one, evidenced chiefly by her citations to, and reliance upon, cases 
employing the correct standard.  In other words, the IJ’s only error was one of 
nomenclature, not application.  Especially in light of the overwhelming evidence in the 
record that supports the IJ’s finding that Samara’s marriage to Martelli was a sham, we 
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deem such error of nomenclature to be harmless where, as here, the application was 
correct and it is thus highly probable that the error did not affect the outcome of the case.  
See Li Hua Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see 
also Cao He Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 428 F.3d 391, 402 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that 
remand is unnecessary “where the IJ or BIA’s reliance on an erroneous aspect of its 
reasoning is so tangential that there is no realistic possibility that the outcome would be 
different on remand” or “where—notwithstanding admitted errors—overwhelming 
evidence supporting the administrative adjudicator’s findings makes it clear that the same 
decision would have been reached in the absence of the errors” (citations omitted)).  
Samara’s argument is therefore futile. 
C. Samara Cannot Show the IJ’s Consideration of the  
USCIS Report Substantially Prejudiced Him 
 
 Samara next argues that the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s decision because the IJ 
improperly considered the USCIS investigative report drafted by Officer Spaulding that 
speculated, in a parenthetical, that an imposter may have posed as Martelli in an 
interview.  More specifically, Samara claims that the IJ’s consideration of the report 
constitutes a due process violation because he did not have an opportunity to cross-
examine Officer Spaulding.  Such due process claims are, of course, constitutional in 
nature and thus within our jurisdiction.  Singh v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 533, 537 (3d Cir. 
2006). 
 Due process in the context of an immigration hearing requires that individuals 
“threatened with deportation are provided the right to a full and fair hearing that allows 
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them a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on their behalf.”  Abdulrahman v. 
Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 596 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  In particular, due process requires that such an individual: (1) is entitled to 
fact-finding based on a record produced before the decision maker and disclosed to her; 
(2) must be allowed to make arguments on her own behalf; and (3) has the right to an 
individualized determination of her interests.  Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (citations and quotations omitted).  
 Here, however, we need not decide whether the agency erred in considering the 
USCIS report without giving Samara an opportunity to cross-examine Officer Spaulding.  
Even assuming error, Samara must still show substantial prejudice in order to prevail on 
his due process claim.  See Singh, 432 F.3d at 541 (citing Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 
F.3d 442, 448 (3d Cir. 2005)).  But he cannot do so.   
Although the IJ indeed discussed the contents of the USCIS report in her recitation 
of the documentary evidence in the record, she only relied on it in a sole paragraph 
among the nearly five pages of her decision devoted to her findings.  Moreover, that 
paragraph appeared only in her analysis of why Samara deserved an adverse credibility 
finding.  As to the dispositive question of whether to grant Samara’s good faith marriage 
waiver application, the IJ explicitly stated that, “even absent [her] adverse credibility 
finding,” Samara did not demonstrate that he warranted a waiver.  App. 26.  The BIA did 
not even mention, much less rely on, the USCIS report in affirming the IJ’s decision.   
In light of the overwhelming record evidence that supports the IJ’s finding that 
Samara’s marriage to Martelli was a sham, we cannot discern any prejudice—much less 
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substantial prejudice—by virtue of the USCIS report’s inclusion in the record.  Because 
Samara cannot show such prejudice, his due process argument is unavailing.   
D. We Lack Jurisdiction to Address the Agency’s Weighing of the Evidence 
Samara’s third argument concerns the IJ’s evaluation of the evidence.  In 
particular, he contends that the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s decision because she 
improperly weighed Martelli’s testimony and evidence of lump sum payments.  But we 
have consistently held that “arguments such as that an [IJ] or the BIA incorrectly weighed 
evidence, failed to consider evidence[,] or improperly weighed equitable factors are not 
questions of law” subject to judicial review.  Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 189 
(3d Cir. 2007).  Thus, we lack jurisdiction to address this argument.  See Sukwanputra, 
434 F.3d at 634 (citations omitted).    
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny in part and dismiss in part Samara’s 
petitions for review. 
